Casting Common Law and the Music Industry Adrift: Pre-1972 Recordings Enter Federal Safe Harbors by Pinchin, Andrew M.




ANDREW M. PINCHIN 
Casting Common Law and the Music 
Industry Adrift: Pre-1972 Recordings 
Enter Federal Safe Harbors 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 636 
I.  Background Law ................................................................... 640 
A. A Brief Demystification of DMCA Safe Harbors .......... 641 
B. The Entertainment Industry Combats “Time-
Shifting” of Copyrighted Works .................................... 645 
C. Free Music: A Boon for Consumers, and/or a Bust for 
Artists and Labels? ......................................................... 648 
D. User-Uploaded Content and the Appropriateness of 
Safe Harbors ................................................................... 652 
II.  Present Change in Copyright Law ......................................... 654 
A. The Conventional Wisdom about Pre-1972 
Recordings ...................................................................... 654 
B. Common-Law Copyright in Sound Recordings and 
Grooveshark Attack ....................................................... 656 
C. MP3tunes’s Critical Expansion of Safe Harbors ............ 659 
1. The Google Amicus Factor ...................................... 662 
III.  Impressions and Implications of MP3tunes........................... 664 
 
 J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Oregon School of Law; Managing Editor, Oregon 
Law Review 2012–2013; B.A. Performing Arts–Music, 2000, Liverpool Institute for 
Performing Arts/Liverpool John Moore’s University, Liverpool, England; Professional 
Guitarist, 2001–10. I give my grateful thanks to Professor Eric Priest for his ideas, 
thoughts, and feedback. 
PINCHIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  1:19 PM 
636 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 635 
A. Viability of the Court’s Reasoning and Policy 
Concerns ......................................................................... 664 
B. The U.S. Copyright Office Discusses Incorporation 
of Pre-1972 Recordings .................................................. 667 
C. Argument for Legislative Action ................................... 669 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 672 
If the next format is a form of downloading from the Internet, with 
distribution and manufacturing savings passed on to the American 
consumer, then, of course, we will embrace that format. But how 
can we embrace a new format and sell our music for a fair price 
when somebody with a few lines of code, no investment cost, no 
creative input, and no marketing expenses simply gives it away? 




he music industry is a shadow of its former self. The concept of 
“record” sales seems archaic in a world where music listeners 
purchase music via the click of a mouse rather than the chime of a 
cash register. The notion of oneself as a music purist might be a 
bygone concept, where a simple application can make a digitalized 
MP3 music file sound like an old vinyl record.2 The growth of the 
Internet caused panic and confusion for record companies that were 
caught off-guard by the development of technology that allowed users 
to convert CDs to digital MP3 music files.3 Previously, piracy of CDs 
was easily discoverable—physical, tangible CD copies changed 
hands. But what happened when the activity could not be easily 
 
1 Music on the Internet: Is There an Upside to Downloading?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 10 (2000) (statement of Lars Ulrich, Member and 
Co-Founder, Metallica Musical Group, NY), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov 
/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_hearings&docid=f:74728.pdf. The quote is from 
the Metallica drummer’s July 11, 2000, testimony concerning the band’s legal issues with 
Napster and downloading music on the Internet. 
2 See Casey Chan, VinylLove for iPad Creates That Warm Vinyl Record Sound for Your 
MP3s, GIZMODO (Apr. 16, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5792791/vinyllove-for     
-ipad-re+creates-that-warm-vinyl-record-sound-for-your-mp3s. 
3 STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION 118 (2009). Knopper tells the 
story of how the MP3 began as a research project by a team of German engineers seeking 
to find “a way to send tiny music files over phone lines” in the late 1970s. Id. at 116. By 
1991, the German team had refined the MP3 technology, and nobody in the music industry 
knew “MP3 existed, let alone that it contained no copy protection.” Id. at 118. 
T
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monitored—when a song could be reduced to computer data and 
produce a quality indistinguishable from a CD to an average listener? 
Internet entrepreneurs, software programmers, and wily consumers 
did not take long to realize the potential of music in the digital MP3 
format. Not only could MP3s be burned onto blank CDs, but—better 
still—because of the manageable file size, MP3s could be traded via 
email and the Internet.4 A plethora of files were freely exchanged 
between users, spurred on by music sharing sites such as the original 
Napster.5 The copyright implications eventually landed with the 
record industry. Essentially, a copyrighted sound recording purchased 
by one legitimate user on CD could be “ripped” by that user and 
saved as a digital MP3 file on his or her home computer.6 Massive 
infringement of reproduction and distribution rights occurred when 
that digital copy was itself copied and shared between further users ad 
infinitum by either CD burning or electronic transfer.7 Enforcement 
on a case-by-case basis against those millions of users who obtained 
infringing copies was simply impossible. Billions of dollars of 
potential profit for record companies were on the brink of evaporating 
if the free exchange of music became commonplace. 
While record companies struggled for a solution, technology 
giants, most notably Apple, refined and resolved a technologically 
efficient and legal method for selling music digitally.8 In fact, Apple’s 
sales bloomed and then flourished; by February 2010, iTunes had sold 
ten billion songs since its 2003 inception.9 The iPod galvanized itself 
 
4 See id. 
5 For discussion of Napster’s influence and ultimate legal demise, see infra Part I.A. 
6 “Ripping” is the term given the file compression process whereby a song on a CD is 
converted into an MP3 file. 
7 The owner of the copyright in the sound recording, usually a record company by 
assignment, has the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords” and “to distribute copies . . . by sale or other transfer of ownership.” 17 
U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2006). Anyone who violates those exclusive rights infringes. Id. § 
501(a). 
8 See KNOPPER, supra note 3, at 166–82. Knopper describes how Steve Jobs and Apple 
worked their way through the industry, convincing it label-by-label that iTunes and the 
iPod was the best way to control and maintain profitability in the distribution of digital 
music. Sony was perhaps the staunchest opponent of digital music, having its own history 
of success with the seminal portable music player, the Walkman. However, “with the other 
major labels plunging into iTunes, Sony had no choice. The company gritted its teeth and 
signed on.” Id. at 175. 
9 See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Apple Hits 10 Billion Songs Sold—But What’s Happening to 
Music Sales Growth?, THE GUARDIAN TECHNOLOGY BLOG (Feb. 25, 2010, 11:34 EST), 
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in the public consciousness, fusing technology and fashion to become 
the most sought after accessory of the last decade.10 Perhaps hindsight 
is advantageous, but the record industry’s reluctance to embrace the 
digital revolution may have cost it dearly. Instead of immediately 
finding a means to exploit the MP3 for their own gain, record 
companies found themselves placed over Apple’s proverbial barrel 
and were forced to embrace iTunes’s practical monopoly.11 Of 
course, the bigger threat was posed by the free exchange of music. 
The record industry had already commenced high-profile litigation 
against service providers in an effort to curtail file-sharing. Notable 
early victories came against file-sharing services such as Napster, 
Limewire, and Grokster, but Internet entrepreneurs, learning from 
their forerunners’ mistakes, continually develop new models that 
provide free online music while obscuring the point at which 
copyright infringement takes place. The biggest obstacle preventing 
record companies from obtaining sweeping injunctive relief is the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).12 Specifically, the 
DMCA contains safe harbor protections for Online Service Providers 
(OSPs).13 Recognizing the difficulties of policing the Internet, the 
safe harbors were largely designed to limit the liability of OSPs for 
content placed online by users. They require OSPs to adhere to certain 
statutory requirements, such as swift compliance with takedown 
requests and removal of user accounts belonging to repeat offenders. 
 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2010/feb/25/apple-ten-billion-songs-itunes     
-analysis. 
10 See generally Haroon Malick, iPod Wins T3’s “Best Gadget of All Time” Award, 
GIZMODO (Oct. 13, 2007, 6:00 PM), http://gizmodo.com/310578/ipod-wins-t3s-best          
-gadget-of-all-time-award. 
11 See KNOPPER, supra note 3, at 178–79. In 2003, labels would make sixty-seven cents 
(to be shared with artists) from each ninety-nine cent song—a significant drop from ten to 
twelve dollars for each eighteen dollar CD—but that was the deal imposed by Apple’s 
successful sales model. Id. at 178. 
12 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as enacted and amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The DMCA was an 
addition to the Copyright Act enacted by Congress to address copyright issues on the 
Internet—something not contemplated at the time of the Act’s last major overhaul in 1976. 
See discussion infra Part I.A. The U.S. Copyright Act is codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1332. 
13 Throughout this Comment, the abbreviation “OSP” will broadly refer to online music 
businesses that offer storage, streaming, or file sharing of digitalized music files such as 
MP3s. The acronym is somewhat interchangeable with “ISP” (Internet Service Provider), 
but that term more appropriately refers to services such as Comcast—that is, providers of 
bandwidth or access. Hence, unless ISP is used in quoted material, for clarity and 
simplicity I will only use OSP. 
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If OSPs comply, then they may be eligible for the protection.14 
Recognizing that the safe harbors gave OSPs a powerful new defense 
against infringement actions, record companies were forced to change 
legal tactics. 
A recent trend saw record companies bringing lawsuits designed to 
stop OSPs’ use of music recorded prior to 1972. The method was one 
of a few ways to circumvent DMCA safe harbors and strengthen the 
likelihood of obtaining injunctions to shutdown OSPs perceived as 
copyright infringers. Sound recordings were not added to the U.S. 
Copyright Act (Copyright Act) until the Sound Recording 
Amendment of 1971.15 After the amendment was incorporated into § 
301(c) of the Copyright Act, sound recordings “fixed” prior to the 
February 15, 1972, statutory limitation were considered to be 
governed by the common law of copyright.16 In other words, the 
Copyright Act does not cover pre-1972 recordings, and thus OSPs 
cannot claim safe harbor protection for usage of these recordings. 
Sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972, however, are within 
the purview of the federal Copyright Act and thus the DMCA, 
meaning such recordings’ use is subject to statutory safe harbors. 
Therefore, the record industry’s litigation strategy was to sue under 
the common law of copyrights and unfair competition in state courts, 
rather than under the federal Copyright Act, which, post-DMCA, 
seemingly favored OSPs. Record companies assumed, with seeming 
justification from § 301(c) of the Copyright Act, that their back 
catalogues pre-dating the Act were beyond the reach of DMCA safe 
harbors. As courts expounded on the safe harbor statutes, record 
companies’ resort to common-law-based state statutes seemed a 
sound, tried-and-tested strategy. However, a recent decision in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, may take the wind out of the record 
 
14 For a thorough discussion of DMCA safe harbors, see infra Part I.A. 
15 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. At that time, the Copyright 
Act was in its 1909-enacted form. 
16 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2006). The common law of copyright is generally embodied 
in state statutes; in some copyright-hub states such as New York, it is embodied more 
comprehensively than others. See generally infra Part II.B. The Copyright Act’s definition 
of “fixed” is “in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or 
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more 
than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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companies’ sails.17 MP3tunes held that copyright common law and 
the Copyright Act/DMCA can operate in tandem, and crucially, that 
DMCA’s safe harbors are thus applicable to OSPs that make pre-1972 
recordings available to their users.18 The decision runs contrary to 
previous understanding and could feasibly make copyright 
enforcement significantly more difficult for record companies. 
This Comment describes the impact of MP3tunes and assesses the 
likelihood of the decision becoming widely implemented. It also 
argues that Congress should intervene, as it has done for other 
contentious copyright issues, and amend the outdated Copyright Act 
to govern pre-1972 recordings in the same manner as all sound 
recordings fixed after 1972. Part I outlines the relevant background 
law, including the key safe-harbor provisions of the DMCA, and also 
examines cases which shaped present litigation surrounding OSPs’ 
indirect liability as contributory infringers. That discussion includes 
how the concept of time-shifting,19 which first arose in litigation over 
VCRs, translated into a defense employed by OSPs against record 
companies, albeit less successfully. Part II examines the background 
of pre-1972 recordings and the common law of copyright within 
which they previously resided, followed by analysis of the MP3tunes 
case. Part III critiques the MP3tunes court’s reasoning and assesses 
other policy considerations that will dictate whether the Copyright 
Act should govern pre-1972 recordings. 
I 
BACKGROUND LAW 
The goal of this section is to provide sufficient background for the 
reader to make a determination of whether claims should be permitted 
under copyright common law amid a regime dominated by the federal 
Copyright Act. First, the section discusses the statutory protections 
Congress afforded to providers of online services through the DMCA. 
Second, it discusses how the furor over Sony’s Betamax recorder 
fueled the contributory infringement doctrine. Third, it briefly 
 
17 Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC (MP3tunes), 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
18 Id. at 641–42. 
19 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984) (discussing time-shifting whereby the user of a Sony-produced videotape recorder 
videotaped a program to view at a different time than the network broadcasted it). 
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discusses the Napster20 case and its progeny. Fourth, this section ties 
the doctrine-shaping litigation of yesteryear to current developments. 
A. A Brief Demystification of DMCA Safe Harbors 
The DMCA comprises enactments in and amendments to Title 17 
of the United States Code and incorporates two international treaties: 
the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and 
the Performance and Phonograms Treaty.21 With technology 
progressing exponentially, Congress reacted to shortcomings of the 
Copyright Act, which understandably could not address twenty-first 
century copyright issues associated with multimedia in the Internet 
age. In the DMCA, Congress designed legislative measures aimed at 
balancing the needs of modern consumers and suppliers with those of 
substantial copyright owners, such as record companies and movie 
studios. It was a substantial and necessary addition to the Copyright 
Act to address the meteoric expansion of the Internet. The DMCA 
clarified protections available to copyright owners whose work would 
become available in electronic form, while also limiting liability of 
OSPs via safe-harbor provisions to encourage entrepreneurship and 
technological innovation.22 
The safe-harbor provisions in the DMCA had significant 
implications for both the record industry and online music service 
providers.23 The safe harbors were designed to limit the liability for a 
compliant OSP defendant faced with claims of contributory or 
vicarious liability by copyright-owner plaintiffs.24 Put another way, 
the safe harbors provide a map for OSPs to defend themselves against 
indirect liability for the direct infringement of user-uploaded 
copyrighted material. Under § 512 in the Copyright Act, an OSP “will 
not be liable for infringement for 1) transitory digital network 
 
20 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
21 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (the 
preamble states the purpose is in part to “implement the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty”). 
22 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
23 See id. § 512(a)–(d). The “safe harbors” referred to and elaborated upon in this 
section are affirmative defenses statutorily provided in the DMCA for OSPs to limit their 
liability upon discovery of infringing content on their servers. They are particularly 
relevant in the context of user-uploaded content, and legislators recognized the 
monumental task facing OSPs in policing the thousands of files uploaded each day. 
24 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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communications; 2) system caching; 3) information residing on 
systems at the direction of users; and 4) information location tools.”25 
Most cases discussed in this Comment involve information that 
users place online.26 The specific safe harbors for OSPs providing a 
hosting service are located at § 512(c) of the Copyright Act.27 The 
threshold inquiry under § 512(c) is whether the OSP had actual 
knowledge of infringement by its subscribers, or if it subsequently 
became aware or should have become aware of circumstances making 
infringement apparent.28 Courts have described the latter as the “‘red 
flag’ test.”29 In the absence of knowledge, the OSP may only be 
found liable after receiving notice via the “notice and takedown” 
provisions of § 512(c).30 Prompt action to remove the alleged 
infringing material will restore the OSP’s immunity.31 If notice given 
by the aggrieved copyright owner is deficient under standards set 
forth in § 512(c)(3), then the OSP will not be deemed to have 
obtained knowledge.32 Additionally, if the OSP did have “the right 
and ability to control” the activity of its users, a lack of financial 
 
25 1 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, 
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 1:50.50 (3d ed. 2006) (footnotes omitted). 
26 The archetypal example of this is YouTube. Users are encouraged to share original 
material, but many upload copyrighted clips of movies, TV shows, and songs. Compliance 
with the DMCA is therefore crucial for YouTube to continuously take advantage of safe 
harbors. 
27 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) states that an OSP shall not be liable for its users’ content if it: 
 (A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using 
the material on the system or network is infringing; (ii) in the absence of such 
actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive a 
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which 
the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (C) 
upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
28 Id. § 512(c)(A). 
29 See, e.g., Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1113–14. 
30 LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 25. 
31 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)) (“Once on notice, if the ISP ‘responds expeditiously 
to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the 
subject of infringing activity’ it will not be liable.”). 
32 See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114 (discussing the effect of 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3)(B)(i)–(ii): “Notice that fails to substantially comply with § 512(c)(3) . . . cannot 
be deemed to impart . . . awareness.”). 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) details the very specific 
notice requirements, which are too long to reproduce here, but suffice it to say a potential 
plaintiff should study the rules with great care. 
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benefit “directly attributable to the infringing activity” prevents 
liability if swift action is taken to remove infringing material after a 
takedown request.33 
Moreover, § 512(i) sets forth the eligibility requirements that OSPs 
must meet before invoking the safe harbors.34 Essentially, eligibility 
is a “question of satisfactory adoption and implementation of account 
termination policies” for users who repeatedly infringe copyrights.35 
Professor Amanda Cooley cautions that certain terms remain ill-
defined, meaning the area of law remains open to judicial 
interpretation.36 Courts have endeavored to maintain Congress’s 
“intent to preserve strong incentives for service providers to cooperate 
with rights owners.”37 Yet, § 512’s privacy provision prevents courts 
from conditioning eligibility for safe harbor protection on an OSP’s 
continuous monitoring of its users or special efforts to weed out 
infringers.38 
Claiming DMCA safe-harbor entitlement has naturally become the 
affirmative defense of choice for OSPs facing entertainment industry 
lawsuits, not only in the music context, but also for streaming video 
services. Courts first ascertain whether the OSP is eligible for DMCA 
safe harbors, and then they use evidence to establish whether there 
 
33 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(B). 
34 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1) reads in part: 
The limitations on liability . . . shall apply . . . only if the service provider—(A) 
has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account 
holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for 
the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders 
of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and (B) 
accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1). 
35 Amanda Harmon Cooley, A Contractual Deterrence Strategy for User-Generated 
Copyright Infringement and Subsequent Service Provider Litigation, 64 SMU L. REV. 691, 
699 (2011); see also Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1109 (“We hold that a service provider 
‘implements’ a policy if it has a working notification system, a procedure for dealing with 
DMCA-compliant notifications, and if it does not actively prevent copyright owners from 
collecting information needed to issue such notifications.”). 
36 Cooley, supra note 35, at 699–700 (“Because only a handful of courts have 
examined the meaning of this subsection’s requirements, those decisions . . . are 
particularly valuable for this developing area of law.”). 
37 Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online 
Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 91 (2010). 
38 Id. at 91–92 (discussing the interaction between § 512(i) and (m)). Professor Bridy 
summarizes: “[W]hile § 512(i) was designed to promote cooperation between rights 
owners and ISPs in online copyright enforcement, it cannot be read in light of § 512(m) to 
impose on qualifying ISPs any affirmative duty to monitor or investigate.” Id. 
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has been sufficient compliance with the DMCA for safe-harbor 
protections to apply.39 From the broader perspective of the 
entertainment industry, each OSP model presents a threat because 
each model is likely to allow users to upload or access files, which 
infringe copyrights to a greater-or-lesser degree. 
A handful of high profile cases and prolific scholarship have begun 
to untangle the nuances of the DMCA.40 Since its implementation, the 
most painful headache for copyright owners of sound recordings has 
been a steady stream of Internet platforms that provide free access to 
music. Copyright owners have enjoyed a good degree of success 
against OSPs by operating peer-to-peer file-sharing sites,41 but they 
have experienced a more difficult time formulating successful 
strategies against OSPs offering more complex models.42 
As a result, record companies’ recent use of pre-1972 recordings as 
a pretext for taking DMCA safe harbors out of the equation is no 
surprise. State laws, stemming from the common law, do not provide 
a tailor-made limitation of liability for OSPs, and the analysis focuses 
squarely on traditional copyright doctrines of direct or contributory 
infringement.43 Needless to say, liability is much more likely for 
OSPs without the benefit of safe-harbor protections. Of course, legal 
tension between the entertainment industry and technological 
pioneers is nothing new, and prior disputes continue to influence 
today’s arguments.44 Before this Comment returns to present 
developments, the following sections highlight case law around which 
 
39 Compare A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster), 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiffs raised serious enough questions and demonstrated that 
the balance tipped in their favor to preclude defendant from obtaining safe-harbor 
protection), with Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (allowing safe-harbor protection for OSP after it complied with takedown 
provisions, despite the possibility that contributory infringement could be found under 
common law). 
40 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); 
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d 1109; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital 
Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 
813 (2001). 
41 See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. 913; Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; Arista Records LLC v. 
Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 
252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
42 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1099 
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that despite the possibility of hosting infringing content, OSP’s 
good faith efforts to limit or avoid hosting that content, and implementation of repeat 
infringer policy qualified OSP for DMCA safe harbor treatment). 
43 For a discussion of the state common law, see infra Part II.B. 
44 See discussion infra Part I.B–C. 
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modern parties shape their legal theories, particularly in the realm of 
alleged contributory infringement by OSPs. The Comment starts by 
looking back to 1984 and the legal implications surrounding the 
advent of the videotape recorder. 
B. The Entertainment Industry Combats “Time-Shifting” of 
Copyrighted Works 
Acknowledgment and understanding of the famous United States 
Supreme Court case, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.,45 is vitally important to assess recent and current 
litigation. Concepts emanating from Sony-Betamax laid the 
foundation for strategies employed by parties, particularly defendants, 
in cases involving OSPs and the entertainment industry. In 1975, the 
introduction of Sony’s Betamax videotape recorder sent shockwaves 
through the entertainment industry.46 The implications for profits 
derived from copyrighted works were immense; film studios, for 
example, imagined a world where nobody paid to watch or own a 
movie. 
The concept of “time-shifting” was introduced to television 
viewers, whereby they no longer needed to watch programs or movies 
at the exact times the network aired them.47 Instead, programs could 
be recorded and watched at the viewer’s leisure, and more 
significantly, kept in the consumer’s personal collection 
indefinitely—free of charge.48 Worse still, the entertainment industry 
 
45 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Sony-Betamax), 464 U.S. 417 
(1984). 
46 For an interesting and succinct discussion of how VHS eventually won the format 
battle with Betamax, see David Owen, The Betamax vs VHS Format War, 
MEDIACOLLEGE.COM (May 1, 2005), http://www.mediacollege.com/video/format 
/compare/betamax-vhs.html. JVC introduced VHS in 1976, a year after Betamax, and 
while many industry experts considered Betamax technically superior, VHS prevailed and 
became the industry standard. Id. The single reason is not entirely clear, but Davis posits 
that the main factors were the longer recording time of VHS cassettes, the superior video 
rental library available on VHS, and perhaps the fact that Sony refused to make 
pornography available on Betamax. Id. 
47 Sony-Betamax, 464 U.S. at 423. 
48 See David J. DeSimone, Note, Copyright Law: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc.: The Supreme Court Applies the Doctrines of Fair Use and Contributory 
Infringement to Home Videotaping, 53 UMKC L. REV. 126, 140 (1984) (discussing 
arguments raised by Universal: “(1) their revenues will decrease because the amount of 
time-shifting cannot be measured; (2) their ‘live television and movie audiences will 
decrease’; (3) their rerun audiences will be smaller; (4) ‘theater or film rental exhibition 
will suffer.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
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feared, the recorded shows and movies would be sold in a new and 
uncontrollable black market. Those were not possibilities the 
entertainment industry was willing to entertain, and Universal Studios 
(Universal) and Walt Disney Productions (Disney) sued.49 The case 
reached the United States Supreme Court in 1984.50 
Universal and Disney opted not to sue consumers who violated 
copyright but instead sought to cut the hardware off at the source by 
enjoining the manufacturing and marketing of Betamax players by 
Sony.51 After an initial ruling for Sony in the district court, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed and held Sony liable for contributory infringement.52 
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and found in 
favor of Sony.53 The Court found an “unprecedented attempt to 
impose copyright liability,” affirming the district court’s findings that 
the primary use of VTRs (early VCRs) was to time-shift programs for 
personal viewing at a later time.54 Noting that the complex task of 
defining the scope of copyright is constitutionally reserved to 
Congress,55 the Court emphasized the relationship between 
development of technology and the law of copyright.56 The Court 
pointed out that while the Copyright Act grants the holder five 
different types of exclusive rights,57 “[a]ll reproductions of the 
 
49 Sony-Betamax, 464 U.S. at 421. 
50 Id. at 417. 
51 Id. at 420. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 421. 
54 Id. 
55 The Copyright and Patent Clause, as cited by the Sony-Betamax Court, reads: “The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” Id. at 428 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
56 Id. at 429–31 (“Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of 
authors . . . in the control and exploitation of their writings . . . on the one hand, and 
society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas . . . on the other hand, our patent and 
copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly . . . the law of copyright has developed in 
response to significant changes in technology.” (footnote omitted)). 
57 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) provides: 
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in 
the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly; and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
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work . . . are not within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner; 
some are in the public domain.”58 
Sony-Betamax’s legacy is its creation of an exception to the 
doctrine of contributory copyright infringement.59 The doctrine was 
somewhat in its infancy at the time—unsurprising considering that 
Betamax was the fledgling consumer technology for copying 
audiovisual works in any large-scale way. The Court found Sony’s 
situation could be distinguished from typical “copyright [contributory 
infringement] cases involving an ongoing relationship between the 
direct infringer and the contributory infringer at the time the 
infringing conduct occurred.”60 Sony’s only contact with the user was 
the point of sale, at which point any involvement ended.61 In other 
words, Sony did not have an ongoing relationship with buyers of its 
Betamax machines at any time before or after the sale. Furthermore, 
the Court explained, contributory infringers would have control over 
“use of copyrighted works by others and [would have] authorized the 
use without permission from the copyright owner.”62 Accordingly, 
Sony was not liable as a contributory infringer because (1) its 
employees had no involvement with infringing activity, (2) its 
employees had no direct contact with customers who recorded 
televised programs, and (3) its customers were not influenced to 
infringe by advertising.63 
The Sony-Betamax rule is that “the sale of copying equipment, like 
the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute 
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses.”64 Clearly consumers could use the 
 
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to 
display the copyrighted work publicly.  
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The current version of § 106 adds a sixth right: “(6) in the case of 
sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
58 Sony-Betamax, 464 U.S. at 433. 
59 See, e.g., Joshua S. Wattles, Modernizing Sony-Betamax for the Digital Age: The 
Ninth Circuit Enables P2P, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 233, 235 (2004). For an introduction to the 
contemporary version of the contributory infringement doctrine through discussion of the 
Napster case, see infra Part II.B. 
60 Sony-Betamax, 464 U.S. at 437. 
61 Id. at 438. 
62 Id. at 437. 
63 Id. at 437–38. 
64 Id. at 442. 
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Betamax machine for direct infringement, but the fact that it was 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses was dispositive.65 The Court 
evinced policy reasons for its decision, stating that uses not obviously 
affecting demand for a copyrighted work or its value “need not be 
prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to create. The 
prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access 
to ideas without any countervailing benefit.”66 Embracing the 
progress of technology and the benefits to consumers, it appears the 
Court predicted that legitimate uses would far outweigh illegitimate 
ones; hence, copyright holders would still be incentivized and reap 
rewards from their efforts. 
The Sony-Betamax decision settled the debate surrounding time-
shifting technology used for recording television broadcasts. A 
decade and a half later, entrepreneurs working within the uncharted 
realm of digital music turned to Sony-Betamax to protect their new 
and controversial music-sharing business models. Things did not go 
exactly as they expected. 
C. Free Music: A Boon for Consumers, and/or a Bust for Artists and 
Labels? 
As the Internet’s possibilities unfolded, infringement across every 
type of media became possible. High quality digital formats now exist 
for books, magazines, movies, television, and of course, music. The 
ripples from Sony-Betamax have continued to eddy between 
technological innovators and copyright holders. The Betamax 
minnow seems minor to copyright holders in comparison to the 
Internet leviathan that rose to the surface during the 1990s and 
beyond. 
Perhaps the most infamous OSP case to date was the Ninth 
Circuit’s A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.67 Napster, in its original 
guise, provided an Internet service that was the epitome of what the 
record industry feared the Internet would do to recorded music—
make it available free of charge. Users of the site were able to simply 
share and swap music with their peers. College student Shawn 
Fanning created Napster, as legend has it, in his dorm room.68 His 
main idea was for users to access a central server where they would 
 
65 See id. at 456. 
66 Id. at 450–51. 
67 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
68 KNOPPER, supra note 3, at 123. 
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view log-on names and a list of MP3s contained on their and other 
users’ hard drives.69 Fanning and his eventual partners probably 
reasoned that Napster itself would not infringe copyrights. Users 
would do the actual sharing or exchange of files through each other’s 
hard drives; all the website contained was textual information on user 
names and MP3 titles.70 Ideas to charge subscription or per-song fees 
were explored but rejected; the prevailing Napster model was set up 
to “generate a huge user base by allowing fans to trade copyrighted 
music.”71 
Record companies, naturally, took serious exception to Napster and 
began submitting cease-and-desist demands. Napster rejected the 
demands wholesale, resulting in one of the most public legal disputes 
in recorded music-copyright history. Steve Knopper describes how 
Napster’s legal theory relied on precedent from Sony-Betamax, 
rationalizing that if “Sony could manufacture VCRs for people to 
record copyrighted TV shows for their own use . . . the same logic 
would apply here.”72 Napster reasoned that it was not actually 
infringing copyrights, characterizing itself as “merely functional, a 
middleman, like the VCR.”73 Napster was steadily gaining a huge 
user base and, as a result of its refusal to comply with the cease and 
desists, a collection of record companies filed suit.74 
The case was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California.75 The district court rejected Napster’s 
arguments that users utilized the service primarily for the purpose of 
“space-shifting” their music in a manner analogous to how users of 
VCRs “time-shifted” in Sony-Betamax.76 The distinction was that 
whereas Sony’s only contact with the consumer was at the point of 
sale, Napster “maintain[ed] and supervise[ed] an integrated system 
 
69 “A search box, set up like Google or AltaVista, would make it easier than ever to 
find a piece of music by artist or title.” Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 129. 
72 Id. at 136. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 131; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 114 F. Supp. 
2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
75 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896. 
76 Id. at 916–17. Space-shifting is accomplished simply when a media file, such as an 
MP3, is stored on one device, then accessed through another. See id. at 904. Recall from 
Sony-Betamax that time-shifting is the recording of a live broadcast for viewing at a later 
time or date. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Sony-Betamax), 464 U.S. 
417, 421 (1984). 
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that users must access to upload or download files.”77 Having 
established a reasonable probability of third-party infringement by 
Napster’s users, the court turned to the allegation that Napster was a 
contributory infringer. A contributory infringer “induces, causes or 
materially contributes” to another’s infringement by having reason to 
know of the other party’s direct infringement; actual knowledge is not 
required.78 The court found damning evidence that Napster’s 
executives knew its users were directly infringing copyright. A 
memo, written by Sean Parker, cautioned against recording users’ real 
names and IP addresses because users were “exchanging pirated 
music” and Napster was “not just making pirated music available but 
also pushing demand.”79 Having also rejected Napster’s First 
Amendment argument, the court issued a preliminary injunction, 
which essentially shut down the website.80 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 
in 2001.81 It held that a preliminary injunction was required, but that 
the district court’s injunction had been overbroad.82 The ruling 
emphasized the limits on Napster’s ability to police user content 
because of its system’s limitations and instructed that the limits 
should be taken into account on remand.83 The court turned to the 
Copyright Act to determine infringement, finding the plaintiffs had 
sufficiently demonstrated ownership of the materials in question and 
the rights of reproduction and distribution had been infringed under § 
106.84 The court found that the district judge had not abused her 
discretion because Napster had a “deleterious effect on the present 
 
77 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916–17 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. at 918. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 922–23, 927. The court preliminarily enjoined Napster “from engaging in, or 
facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing 
plaintiffs’ copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either 
federal or state law, without express permission of the rights owner.” Id. at 927. 
81 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
82 Id. at 1027 (“Specifically, we reiterate that contributory liability may potentially be 
imposed only to the extent that Napster: (1) receives reasonable knowledge of specific 
infringing files with copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings; (2) knows or 
should know that such files are available on the Napster system; and (3) fails to act to 
prevent viral distribution of the works. The mere existence of the Napster system, absent 
actual notice and Napster’s demonstrated failure to remove the offending material, is 
insufficient to impose contributory liability.” (citation omitted)). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1013–14; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2006) (detailing the exclusive rights 
of a copyright owner to reproduce and distribute his work). 
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and future digital download market.”85 The Ninth Circuit also 
affirmed the district court’s findings for the plaintiffs.86 It rejected 
Napster’s arguments that sampling, space-shifting, and other uses 
were fair uses and agreed that Napster was liable as a contributory 
infringer.87 Napster tried to maintain it was protected under the 
DMCA’s safe harbors, but the court disagreed.88 
Technology entrepreneurs were evidently not terribly perturbed by 
Napster’s emphatic defeat. Peer-to-peer file sharing software was 
being launched at a startling rate, and the market leaders became 
hugely successful.89 Kazaa, LimeWire, Grokster, and Morpheus were 
just a few of the many that came and went.90 Those second-
generation peer-to-peer services were built around software called 
“Gnutella,” which was developed around the time Napster was 
embroiled in legal trouble.91 At the new software’s culmination in 
 
85 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1017. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1019–20. 
88 Id. at 1025. Interestingly, the court refused to find the DMCA “inapplicable per se” 
despite Napster’s potential liability as a contributory and vicarious infringer, but it 
reserved the issue for further review at trial on remand. Id. 
89 KNOPPER, supra note 3, at 190. Kazaa had become particularly successful, and by 
2002 it had twenty-two million users in the United States and sixty million worldwide. Id. 
90 As an interesting side note, Kazaa, and other services such as LimeWire, while 
hugely popular, had already garnered negative press for reasons unrelated to music. Music 
industry insiders drew the government’s attention to the fact that peer-to-peer services 
were being used to trade not just music files but also child pornography. See id. at 194. 
The United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary investigated and found that while 
significant distribution of child pornography was occurring, it was no more prevalent over 
peer-to-peer networks than the Internet as a whole. Id. Congress took no further action. Id. 
Regardless, Kazaa and its contemporaries would soon be dealt their day in court. 
91 “Gnutella” software was the brainchild of Justin Frankel—a friend of Shawn 
Fanning—who had also developed Winamp, a well-known piece of software for playing 
MP3s that preceded even Napster. Id. at 148. Unlike Napster, which allowed registered 
users access to a centralized server, Gnutella utilized a system of user nodes, which meant 
each user’s own computer essentially operated as his or her “own server.” Id. LimeWire, 
then Kazaa, Morpheus, and Grokster incorporated the Gnutella approach, or variations 
thereof, into their own downloadable software packages, which allowed users to connect 
to one another directly. See id. at 149, 190–91; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 921 (2005). Reasoning that by removing centralized servers 
they could not be liable for contributory infringement, the OSPs believed that the 
differences between them and Napster would be decisive and save them from their 
predecessor’s fate. See KNOPPER, supra note 3, at 193–95; see also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 
934 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous reading of Sony-Betamax that Grokster and 
its co-defendants could not be held liable, “since there was no showing that their software, 
being without any central server, afforded them knowledge of specific unlawful uses”). 
That did not seem to change the record industry’s view that peer-to-peer networks were 
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2005, the United States Supreme Court delivered a telling victory to 
the entertainment industry over OSPs Grokster, Morpheus, and Kazaa 
in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., announcing 
a standard that imposed liability on those who distribute devices with 
the object of inducing copyright infringement.92 
D. User-Uploaded Content and the Appropriateness of Safe Harbors 
The peer-to-peer services already highlighted were found to be 
inducers of infringement because they provided software designed to 
allow users to transfer infringing files to one another. The exclusive 
rights of reproduction and distribution under § 106 of the Copyright 
Act were violated.93 As announced in Grokster, peer-to-peer OSPs’ 
indirect liability could be clearly predicated upon inducement to 
infringe through the provision of software that was arguably (and 
successfully argued) designed with infringing uses in mind.94 While 
not actually hosting content on the servers, the makers of peer-to-peer 
software nonetheless knowingly facilitated and encouraged direct 
infringement by users, and thus, were found indirectly, 
contributorially, or vicariously liable. 
The DMCA, in large part, contemplates systems where OSPs 
provide storage and streaming platforms and often host user-uploaded 
content.95 While that content may infringe, a central idea is to limit 
liability of OSPs in situations where subscribers share original 
content.96 Indirect liability was easy to find for peer-to-peer networks 
that evidently had an overriding purpose of users sharing infringing 
content, but it is harder to prove when the underlying purpose is 
streaming original content. 
 
massive facilitators of copyright infringement, which made ensuing courtroom clashes 
inevitable. 
92 Grokster, 545 U.S. 913. The district and appeals courts agreed with the defendants’ 
argument that they simply provided a peer-to-peer, file-sharing service, thus having no 
control over what users did with it. See id. at 927. The Court vacated and remanded, 
unanimously holding “that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its 
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” Id. at 
919. Knopper explains, “[o]n the one hand, the [C]ourt preserved Universal City Studios v. 
Betamax, reaffirming viewers’ rights to tape programs for personal use. On the other, the 
justices added the concept of ‘inducement to infringe,’ punishing companies that 
encourage copyright violation.” KNOPPER, supra note 3, at 195. 
93 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2006). 
94 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37. 
95 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
96 See id. 
PINCHIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  1:19 PM 
2012] Casting Common Law and the Music Industry Adrift: 653 
Pre-1972 Recordings Enter Federal Safe Harbors 
Still, the distinction between peer-to-peer networks and newer sites 
offering users the opportunity to upload and/or stream content may 
seem somewhat attenuated. For example, several searches on 
YouTube for popular shows or artists will yield hundreds of 
unlicensed uses of film and music.97 Most often they are users’ 
favorite scenes from a TV show, movie, or original user-created 
footage cut to a favorite song. However, an argument can be made 
that sites like YouTube, which promote original content, encourage 
traditional intellectual property ideals around the sharing of creations 
to spawn further creation. But peer-to-peer services simply did not 
market themselves as a way to share original ideas; rather, they were 
marketed as a way to share free music and videos. 
DMCA safe harbors provide much-needed clarity for both 
copyright owners and OSPs hosting user-uploaded content. There is 
some complexity in securing takedown. Some refer to it as a 
“notification dance”98 because of the highly specific, multi-step 
performance a copyright owner and OSP must go through to remove 
infringing material.99 Yet the safe harbors enunciate one of very few 
bright-line tests in the highly complex and contested field of 
copyright law. It may not be a perfect system, but it goes some way to 
keeping both parties in the “notification dance” honest. Copyright 
owners have a means to demand takedown of their infringed material 
as granted by the DMCA. When an OSP fails to comply with express 
statutory instructions, owners have a green light to seek court 
assistance, injunctive relief, and damages.100 OSPs, on the other hand, 
also have a clear system of compliance of which they must be 
cognizant to avoid liability. 
Despite the benefits of clarity within the DMCA, a problem 
remains that in the absence of a clearly delineated system of royalty 
payment, the takedown provisions are not satisfactory for some 
copyright owners. Certain OSPs walk a very fine line between 
infringement and compliance. The music industry has recognized this 
and, judging by its litigiousness, it is a fair assumption that industry 
heavyweights still wish to be in sole control of the distribution of their 
wares. 
 
97 As an example, try typing the search term “friends” at YouTube.com. 
98 Professor Eric Priest introduced me to this term, which provides a well-suited 
metaphor for the back-and-forth between copyright owners and OSPs. 
99 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3); supra Part I.A. 
100 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j). 
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The scene remains set for continued courtroom dalliances between 
emerging OSPs and record companies. Napster and Grokster 
flattened the misconception that Sony-Betamax could be applied to 
peer-to-peer networks via a space-shifting argument. But the DMCA, 
through safe harbors, has thrown an undeniable lifeline to OSP 
entrepreneurs willing to take the plunge into the statute’s murky 
waters. The obvious solution for record companies dissatisfied with 
the DMCA was to steer clear of the safe harbors altogether by suing 
under copyright common law. The Copyright Act seemed to have 
such a wondrous outlet—the pre-1972 recordings clause—that was, 
until MP3tunes and Universal Music Group (UMG) squared off in a 
New York courtroom. 
II 
PRESENT CHANGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
This section begins with an explanation of the Copyright Act 
provision that was generally accepted to exempt pre-1972 recordings 
from the reach of federal copyright law, placing them within the 
purview of state laws. Next, it looks back at state cases, which 
incorporate copyright common-law doctrine, concerning pre-1972 
recordings where safe harbor defenses were conspicuous in their 
absence. Finally, the section examines the MP3tunes decision. Of 
note are that court’s and amicus briefs’ plain language interpretations, 
which appear contrary to the seemingly unambiguous pre-1972-
recordings provision. 
A. The Conventional Wisdom about Pre-1972 Recordings 
A recent major issue of contention between record companies and 
OSPs is whether infringement suits concerning pre-1972 recordings 
are subject to state or federal law. Support for the proposition that 
pre-1972 recordings are exempt from DMCA safe harbors can be 
construed from the language of the Copyright Act. The Act provides 
in § 301(c): 
With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, 
any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any 
State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 
2067 . . . no sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall 
be subject to copyright under this title before, on, or after February 
15, 2067.101 
 
101 Id. § 301(c). 
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Hence, courts have read § 301(c) to provide that pre-1972 recordings 
are subject only to state copyright laws, derived from the common 
law of copyright, and are not preempted by provisions of the federal 
Copyright Act (that is safe harbors).102 
Record companies have been eager to act upon that perceived 
loophole. There is substantial consumer demand for pre-1972 
recordings, and after that music is reissued on CD it naturally 
becomes part of the MP3 market.103 However, rather than simply 
attempting to enforce exclusive rights in digitalized old recordings, 
lawsuits have effectively been a subterfuge by record industry 
plaintiffs to create a cause of action that sidesteps DMCA safe harbor 
defenses. The Act’s § 512 sets forth realistic standards for OSPs to 
qualify for safe harbor protection,104 and record companies know 
such standards are attainable. For example, one would assume that 
taking mitigating action when aware of infringing activity would be 
relatively easy for OSPs.105 Courts have shown little patience for 
failure to take such action and even less for OSPs manifesting 
encouragement of infringement.106 On the other hand, courts are more 
than willing to grant safe harbor protection when OSPs manifest 
substantial compliance with § 512—acting swiftly and affirmatively 
when applying takedown requests and terminating repeat infringers’ 
accounts particularly impresses courts.107 Clearly, a conventional 
 
102 See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 436 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussed infra Part II.B). 
103 Many record labels, particularly larger companies such as Sony BMG and UMG, 
which have merged with or acquired other labels over the years, have enormous back 
catalogs of music to exploit for potentially substantial profits. The target market is broad, 
including middle-aged consumers who bought vinyl in their youth and younger listeners 
eager to discover music that influenced their favorite contemporary artists. The old 
recordings, often marketed as classics, are repackaged and reissued as CDs, albums, or 
compilations. The reissued albums frequently tout a superior, remastered sound quality 
and contain bonus tracks (usually studio outtakes) to motivate consumers to replace 
albums they already own. 
104 See 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
105 See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring OSPs to act “expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the [infringing] material” upon becoming aware of such material’s 
existence). 
106 See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 142 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding defendants who were aware of likely infringement, or 
“encouraged or fostered such infringement . . . ineligible for the DMCA’s safe harbor 
provisions”). 
107 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (finding it “uncontroverted that when YouTube was given the [takedown] notices, it 
removed the [infringing] material,” thus qualifying for safe harbor protection). 
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reading of § 301(c) says that pre-1972 recordings are not controlled 
by the Copyright Act. Therefore, the record industry’s most logical 
move was to police its older back catalog by suing for infringement of 
such recordings under state and common law, thus preventing OSPs 
from asserting safe harbor defenses. 
B. Common-Law Copyright in Sound Recordings and Grooveshark 
Attack 
In 2005, the Court of Appeals of New York held that pre-1972 
recordings are protected by New York’s common law, provided the 
infringement occurred in New York.108 At issue in Capitol Records, 
Inc. v. Naxos of America was Naxos’s copying and remastering of a 
selection of 1930s classical recordings belonging to Capitol 
Records.109 The recordings were already in the public domain in the 
United Kingdom where they had been recorded.110 In 1996, Capitol 
acquired exclusive rights to exploit the recordings in the United 
States.111 In 1999, Naxos created a reissue of the recordings in the 
United Kingdom using the original shellac recordings and then 
marketed the remastered CDs in the United States.112 Naxos prevailed 
in the district court, but the Second Circuit certified questions to the 
Court of Appeals of New York, which found that even if Naxos had 
created a new product, Capitol could still prevail on an infringement 
claim under copyright common law.113 The court noted that fraud or 
bad faith is not required as an element under New York copyright 
law, defining the two elements for infringement simply as “(1) the 
existence of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized reproduction of 
the work protected by the copyright.”114 
 
108 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005). The court 
engages in an extensive retrospective of common-law copyright history, explaining that 
sound recordings were initially not protectable as published works in the United States. 
See id. at 256–63. It summarizes a mid-twentieth century case, which was foundational in 
developing modern common-law copyright protection, and characterized “the public sale 
of a sound recording as a ‘limited publication’ that did not divest a composer or artist of 
common-law copyright protection.” Id. at 259 (citing Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950)). 
109 Id. at 252. Naxos is a record label specializing in budget reissues of classical music. 
See NAXOS, http://www.naxos.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
110 Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 253. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. Shellac is a resin that was used to create gramophone records. 
113 See id. at 253–54, 267. 
114 Id. at 266. Additionally, to establish the secondary liability of content providers, 
there is a requirement of inducement to infringe by the provider. See Arista Records LLC 
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The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has 
been at the center of recent developments. Only months before the 
court delivered a game-changing opinion, it allowed the music 
industry to prevail when asserting a state law copyright theory 
regarding pre-1972 recordings in Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group 
LLC in May 2011. The court in that case handed defendant LimeWire 
a comprehensive defeat.115 LimeWire was sued by a large group of 
major record companies including Atlantic, Motown, Sony, Virgin, 
and Warner Brothers; essentially, the entire might of the industry.116 
The court followed the precedent laid out in Naxos strictly and 
applied the same elements.117 LimeWire’s argument that New York 
common law only prohibits direct infringement was rejected.118 The 
court instead relied on the Supreme Court’s Grokster opinion, which 
found that “infringement claims based on secondary liability, 
including claims for inducement of infringement, derive from the 
common law.”119 Most noteworthy was the court’s flat assertion that 
“[f]ederal copyright law does not cover sound recordings made prior 
to 1972. Rather, these recordings are protected by state common law 
on copyright infringement.”120 
A perfect example of intent to use pre-1972 recordings as pretext to 
sue under state law saw UMG file against Escape Media Group, the 
parent corporation of Grooveshark, in a New York state court.121 
Grooveshark is a rapidly rising consumer-favorite OSP that offers an 
Internet radio service whereby users may listen to one-another’s 
collections or original user-produced, uploaded works.122 It has 
 
v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). In Arista Records, the 
district court, examining a state law claim of copyright infringement, determined that 
secondary liability for infringement (i.e., infringement by a service provider, rather than 
direct infringement by consumers) was actionable under New York common law. Id. A 
secondary liability claim arises from a showing of inducement to infringe, the elements of 
which are “direct infringement, purposeful conduct, and intent.” Id. Unfair competition is 
distinguished by the inclusion of fraud or bad faith elements, in addition to requiring 
“competition in the marketplace or similar actions designed for commercial benefit.” 
Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 266. 
115 See Arista Records, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 398. 
116 See id. 
117 Id. at 436. 
118 See id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See Complaint at 7, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Group, Inc., No. 
10100152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Complaint 2010]. 
122 GROOVESHARK, http://www.grooveshark.com/press (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
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progressed rapidly from start-up to success, with millions of 
subscribers today.123 UMG’s “legal jihad” against Escape Media 
Group soon gathered momentum with other record industry giants, 
such as Sony Music Entertainment and Warner Music Group, joining 
UMG’s action.124 
Common-law protection of copyright includes the right “of original 
ownership, the right to make limited publication of the subject matter, 
the right to prevent others from making unauthorized use of the 
subject matter, the right of first publication of the manuscript, and the 
right to secure a statutory copyright.”125 Those rights may be 
perpetual, unless the author makes a general publication or dedicates 
the work to the public.126 UMG’s original complaint is indicative of 
the common-law theory and it is one of multiple suits brought to 
exploit the pre-1972 recordings loophole. Perhaps that helps to 
explain why the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York would decide in Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes that 
copyright law uniformity was needed with all sound recordings 
governed by federal law. In asserting infringements of common law 
copyrights in its pre-1972 recordings, UMG’s original complaint 
alleged unauthorized “reproduction and distribution” by 
Grooveshark.127 Alleging Grooveshark’s “willful, wanton, and 
reckless tortious conduct,” UMG requested compensatory and 
punitive damages, in addition to injunctive relief.128 At the time, the 
legal theory had merit.129 
 
123 Id. 
124 See Alexandra Osorio, Grooveshark Now Getting Sued by Sony, Warner Music 
Group . . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com 
/permalink/2011/111215grooveshark; Paul Resnikoff, Lawyers: Grooveshark May Just 
Have Defeated UMG . . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.digital 
musicnews.com/stories/082511umg. 
125 Catherine Palo, Copyright Infringement Litigation, in 77 AM. JUR. TRIALS 480 (C. 
Joseph Miles ed., 2000) (footnotes omitted). 
126 Id. 
127 Complaint 2010, supra note 121, at 7. 
128 Id. at 7–8. 
129 Although the MP3tunes holding forced abandonment of the common law strategy, 
UMG was evidently not perturbed, and it seeks up to $17,000,000,000 in statutory 
damages in a more recent complaint filed November 2011, in the Southern District of New 
York. See Complaint at 7–8, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Group Inc., No. 11 
Civ. 8407 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011), (explaining that Escape Media employees themselves 
had uploaded 113,777 files that infringed UMG copyrights—that figure multiplied by the 
maximum statutory penalty of $150,000 for each violation comes to possible statutory 
damages of over $17,000,000,000); see also Paul Resnikoff, Grooveshark is Now Facing 
$17 Billion in Damages . . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.digital 
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However, in August 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York completely reversed course from its Arista 
Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC decision. In a potentially huge piece 
of precedent, the court made DMCA safe harbor defenses available 
for use of pre-1972 recordings in Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, 
LLC.130 
C. MP3tunes’s Critical Expansion of Safe Harbors 
The startling increase in the scope of DMCA safe harbors was 
initially inconspicuously indicated in a footnote. In MP3tunes, the 
plaintiff record company won its infringement claim; the New York 
district court granted in part and denied in part summary judgment 
motions from both parties.131 However, in footnote one of the 
opinion, the court provided this tantalizing tidbit: “This Court agrees 
with Defendants that the plain meaning of the statutory language 
makes the DMCA safe harbors applicable to both state and federal 
copyright claims. Thus, the DMCA applies to sound recordings fixed 
prior to February 15, 1972.”132 
The court’s position is consolidated in the main body of Judge 
William H. Pauley III’s superseding opinion delivered in October 
2011.133 The factual background is a familiar tale. A substantial 
amount of copyright-infringing material found its way onto 
MP3tunes, a popular online music-locker service.134 Users paid for 
different subscription levels, receiving a corresponding amount of 
storage and could then freely access and download their files.135 
Amid this seemingly innocuous service, MP3tunes managed to create 
two major problems for itself. First, there was partner site 
 
musicnews.com/permalink/2011/111123grooveshark (discussing UMG’s strategy of suing 
Escape Media’s executives and the possibility of $17,000,000,000 in statutory damages). 
130 Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC (MP3tunes), 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 642 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
131 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), slip op. at 
29 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011), superseded by 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
132 Id. at 12 n.1. 
133 See MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 642. 
134 The court describes how MP3tunes was a second attempt at success by Internet 
entrepreneur Michael Robertson after a lawsuit closed down his previous company, 
MP3.com. Id. at 633. MP3.com had offered access to music online if users could 
demonstrate they already owned the CD. Id. Robertson paid millions in damages to 
plaintiff record companies, sold the service, and started MP3tunes in 2005. Id. 
135 Id. 
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Sideload.com, a search engine that provided a plug-in136 for 
MP3tunes users to locate free MP3 files from around the Internet and 
“sideload” them to personal online “lockers.”137 Second, a feature 
called LockerSync allowed retrieval of album artwork while songs 
were being uploaded to or played from a “locker.”138 
EMI Music Group North America (EMI) discovered that Sideload 
and LockerSync were linking to 350 files and websites that infringed 
its copyrights.139 After EMI issued takedown notices, MP3tunes 
removed cited Internet links from Sideload and LockerSync, but did 
not delete infringing files obtained from those sites that remained in 
user accounts.140 EMI sued and predictably prevailed on both its 
summary judgment claim for contributory infringement regarding the 
files remaining in user accounts, and its claim of direct infringement 
by site-owner Robertson for sideloaded material.141 Far more 
unexpected was the court’s holding that a DMCA safe harbor defense 
is available for pre-1972 recordings.142 
The court rejected EMI’s argument that § 301(c) of the Copyright 
Act effectively trumps the DMCA.143 EMI cited precedent from 
Capital Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, where the Second Circuit 
held that “federal copyright protections do not preempt or limit 
common law rights in pre–1972 works,” reaffirming the United States 
Supreme Court’s Goldstein v. California holding.144 Judge Pauley III 
instead found MP3tunes to be a case of first impression because 
Goldstein and Naxos were about older federal copyright protections 
and did not address the limits of the DMCA.145 Accordingly, “reading 
section 301 in context and looking to the architecture of the Copyright 
Act as a whole,” Judge Pauley III concluded, “there is no conflict 
 
136 A “plug-in” is a piece of supplemental software written to provide a specific 
additional function within the original software. 
137 Id. at 634. The court notes that MP3tunes executives had personal accounts and used 
the Sideload feature themselves. Id. at 635. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. At issue in the suit were EMI’s claims that “3,189 sound recordings, 562 musical 
compositions, and 328 images of album cover art” were infringed. Id. 
141 Id. at 649. 
142 Id. at 642. 
143 Recall § 301(c) provides that, with regard to pre-1972 recordings, “any rights or 
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by 
[provisions of the Copyright Act] until February 15, 2067.” 17 U.S.C. § 310(c) (2006). 
144 MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 516, 522 
(1973) and Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
145 Id. 
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between § 301 and the DMCA’s safe harbors for infringement of pre–
1972 recordings.”146 Read in context, the court reasoned, it is true 
that § 301(c) “is an anti-preemption provision ensuring that the grant 
of federal copyright protection did not interfere with common law or 
state rights established prior to 1972.”147 However, considering the 
statute as a whole, the court decided, “section 301(c) does not prohibit 
all subsequent regulation of pre–1972 recordings.”148 
The court proceeded to reject EMI’s further argument that § 501(a) 
is an exhaustive definition of copyright infringement.149 Instead, the 
court decided that referenced §§ 106 through 122 simply provided a 
list of infringements, but not an all-inclusive one.150 Because 
common law terms must be given their common law meaning, the 
court stated: “It is beyond dispute that the common law meaning of 
the term ‘copyright infringement’ encompasses violations of both 
federal and state protections.”151 Because EMI’s interpretation would 
lead to an absurd result in the court’s opinion, it unleashed the 
scathing stricture that “EMI’s interpretation of 301(c) would 
eviscerate the purpose of the DMCA.”152 
The court offered several legal and policy reasons for its position. 
First, it voiced concerns about legal uncertainty, particularly because 
some recordings’ year-of-origin cannot be pinpointed exactly.153 
Second, it expressed fears about potential liability for innocent OSPs 
for the actions of third parties if EMI’s position were followed.154 
Third, it reasoned that the DMCA was enacted as a clarification of 
copyright law amid the massive expansion of Internet technology.155 
Thus, the current position of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 641. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) provides: 
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as 
provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 
106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in 
violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as 
the case may be. 
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006). 
150 MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 641. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 642. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
PINCHIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  1:19 PM 
662 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 635 
District of New York is this: “The plain meaning of the DMCA’s safe 
harbors, read in light of their purpose, covers both state and federal 
copyright claims. Thus, the DMCA applies to sound recordings fixed 
prior to February 15, 1972.”156 
1. The Google Amicus Factor 
The MP3tunes court possibly took serious notice of an amicus brief 
filed by Google on behalf of the defendants.157 Google’s presence as 
an amicus curiae was hardly surprising given its consistently 
expanding portfolio of online multimedia and entertainment 
services.158 Google argued that the safe-harbor provisions should 
additionally protect OSPs under the common law to maintain the 
degree of certainty pledged by the DMCA.159 Google further posited 
that Congress sought to promote user-uploaded content on the 
Internet to further a “global conversation.”160 It acknowledged that 
some content may inadvertently infringe some pre-1972 copyrights 
but maintains that there are greater policy interests at stake in 
promoting the development of the Internet.161 Indeed, it continued, if 
OSPs were suppressed by lawsuits spanning dozens of states and 
 
156 Id. The defendant, MP3tunes, ultimately suffered a crushing defeat with the court 
finding the OSP liable as a contributory infringer. Id. at 649. The court held that MP3tunes 
did not qualify for DMCA safe harbor protections with regard to its user-locker service 
because the OSP had actual knowledge that the lockers frequently contained infringing 
music files obtained from unauthorized sites. Id. 
157 Brief of Amicus Curiae Google Inc. in Support of Defendants, MP3tunes, 821 F. 
Supp. 2d 627 (No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP)(FM)) [hereinafter Brief of Google Inc.]. 
158 In addition to YouTube, which it acquired in 2006, Google initiated Google Music 
in November 2011, an online music locker service that integrates Android Market, its 
online music store aimed to compete with iTunes. ANDROID MARKET, https://market 
.android.com/music?feature=music_general (last visited Oct. 25, 2012); GOOGLE MUSIC, 
https://music.google.com/music/listen#start_pl (last visited Oct. 25, 2012); see also 
Google Buys YouTube for $1.65 Billion, NBCNEWS.COM (Oct. 10, 2006 10:47:04 AM ET), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15196982/ns/business-us_business/t/google-buys-youtube 
-billion/ (detailing Google’s acquisition of YouTube); Glenn Peoples, Google Music 
Launch Unveils a Solid Competitor to Apple, Amazon, Spotify, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Nov. 16, 
2011), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/digital-and-mobile/google-music-launch    
-unveils-a-solid-competitor-1005538162.story (predicting Google Music would rival 
existing services). That was followed by its March 2012 launch of online multimedia 
marketplace Google Play aimed at the smartphone and tablet markets. GOOGLE PLAY, 
https://play.google.com/store (last visited Oct. 25, 2012); see also Chenda Ngak, Google 
Play Launches as Online Entertainment Hub, CBS NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012, 5:41 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501465_162-57391853-501465/google-play-launches-as   
-online-entertainment-hub (describing the features of Google Play). 
159 Brief of Google Inc., supra note 157, at 3 n.4. 
160 Id. at 4. 
161 Id. 
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thousands of works, Congress’s purpose would be defeated, and 
simple but vital everyday services such as email would be seriously 
inhibited.162 
Google’s central argument posited that the safe-harbor provisions, 
which apply to OSPs’ “infringement of copyright,” are “not by [their] 
terms limited to federal copyright law.”163 In other words, because 
the safe-harbor provisions are not limited expressly to federal law, 
they encompass the entire realm of copyright, including common law, 
the Copyright Act, and the DMCA. The MP3tunes court’s reasoning 
was harmonious with that plain language approach to statutory 
interpretation. Google was essentially saying that if the safe harbors 
in § 512 apply solely to material protected under the Copyright Act, 
Congress would have used language referencing that Act. For 
example, §§ 512(a), (b), and (c) state OSPs that meet certain 
conditions “shall not be liable . . . for infringement of copyright.”164 
Yet there are no qualifying statutory references to the Act that 
follow.165 Therefore, a plain language reading could be that the safe 
harbors cover all copyright, federal, and common law. 
The greatest obstacle to Google’s argument was § 301(c) of the 
Copyright Act. However, Google argued that the two sections can be 
readily reconciled and operate in harmony.166 Google pointed out that 
the “rights and remedies” available under state law are not annulled 
by the operation of § 512’s safe harbors.167 All the safe-harbor 
provisions influence are those who may be a defendant and what 
remedies are appropriate for each defendant.168 The plaintiffs remain 
free to pursue their rights and remedies against infringers as before 
and are only limited by the protections the safe harbors afford to 
innocent service providers.169 As an alternative argument, Google 
posited that that the DMCA’s safe harbors would abrogate § 301(c) if 
a court determined the two could not coexist due to § 512 being 
enacted after § 301.170 
 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 2 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006)). 
164 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (emphasis added). 
165 See id. 
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Google’s voice will undoubtedly continue to be heard in high-
profile copyright infringement trials. Google is a powerful ally for 
OSPs with lesser resources, but the record industry remains a 
formidable opponent. The coming months and years will show 
whether the landmark MP3tunes holding will become accepted law. 
The next section discusses why MP3tunes should become accepted 
law, but for reasons different from those implored by Google or 
concluded by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York. 
III 
IMPRESSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF MP3TUNES 
The Southern District of New York is the only court, as of the time 
of this Comment, to hold that pre-1972 recordings are subject to 
DMCA protections. The implications are immense if the court’s 
position becomes widely accepted. Considering that New York, 
alongside California, has long been a central hub for copyright 
litigation, not only will this case provide powerfully persuasive 
precedent for other similar cases in New York; it will likely influence 
other jurisdictions tackling similar questions. If DMCA safe-harbor 
protections can be applied to common-law copyright claims of 
indirect infringement of pre-1972 recordings by OSPs, a valuable 
weapon in record companies’ legal arsenal is removed. As discussed 
above, the common law of copyright carries a low burden of proof for 
an accuser. While defenses exist, such as fair use, they are not nearly 
as expansive or as likely to succeed for OSPs as the defense offered 
by DMCA safe harbors. The terms of the safe harbors are laid out 
such that defendants can easily understand compliance, which is 
unlike the ever-fluctuating common law doctrine. Hence, the 
MP3tunes holding has substantial implications. While hopefully it 
will be consolidated by the legislature, there is good reason to suspect 
the holding will be overturned. 
A. Viability of the Court’s Reasoning and Policy Concerns 
There are significant flaws in the MP3tunes court’s plain language 
interpretation used to reach its conclusion. True, the phrase 
“infringement of copyright” as expressed in § 512(c) is not qualified 
by reference to any section of the Copyright Act.171 Nor is the phrase 
 
171 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006). 
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defined in § 101.172 However, § 501 of the Copyright Act is titled 
“Infringement of Copyright,” which creates a strong presumption that 
Congress intended § 501 alone to define infringement of copyright for 
the entire Act.173 The section states that an infringer of copyright is 
“[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as 
provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords 
into the United States in violation of section 602.”174 Thus, it is 
reasonable to say that the phrase “infringement of copyright,” as used 
throughout the Copyright Act, applies only to §§ 106 through 122, 
106A(a), and 602. No statutory language in § 512 indicates that 
federal provisions—such as safe harbors—are applicable to issues 
governed by common law copyright. 
On the other hand, the most persuasive aspect of the MP3tunes 
opinion is that safe harbors can apply to pre-1972 recordings only if 
they do not annul or limit the application of common law and state 
statutes to pre-1972 recordings per § 301(c) of the Copyright Act. 
This interpretation can be reconciled with the language of § 301(c). 
The court sees no reason why theories cannot be concurrently drawn 
from federal and state law, provided state law trumps federal with 
respect to “rights and remedies.”175 The court could have adopted 
Google’s position and clarified that with regard to pre-1972 
recordings, the common law will govern rights and remedies while § 
512 will provide defenses compatible with a possible plain language 
reading. 
The problem is that both the court and Google gloss over the 
statement in § 301(c) that “no sound recording fixed before February 
15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright under this title before, on, or 
after February 15, 2067.”176 If being subject to copyright means being 
subject to rights and remedies available under the federal Copyright 
Act, then the common law is impermissibly preempted according to 
 
172 See id. § 101. 
173 See id. § 501. 
174 Id. § 501(a). While § 106A(a) deals with the rights of visual artists (authors of 
paintings, drawing, prints, sculptures, and photographs), § 602 is about importation of 
phonorecords (material objects in which sounds are fixed, i.e., CDs). Id. §§ 106A(a), 602. 
175 Id. § 301(c); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC (MP3tunes), 821 F. Supp. 2d 
627, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Read in context, section 301(c) is an anti-preemption 
provision ensuring that the grant of federal copyright protection did not interfere with 
common law or state rights established prior to 1972.”). 
176 Id. 
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the terms of § 301(c). The court and Google interpreted the Act more 
liberally, but the statute on its face is unambiguous: if the Act does 
not reference specific sections, being subject to the Act means being 
subject to the entire Act. Under that reading, OSPs’ use of pre-1972 
recordings cannot have safe harbor protections; the perceived 
loophole does not exist. 
Interestingly omitted from the MP3tunes court’s and Google’s 
analyses is that one provision in § 512 does tie the Copyright Act and 
state and common law together. Seventeen U.S.C. § 512(l) states that 
an OSP’s failure to qualify for safe harbors “shall not bear adversely 
upon the consideration of a defense by the service provider that the 
service provider’s conduct is not infringing under this title or any 
other defense.”177 Thus, if a defendant may call on defenses from the 
common law once excluded from safe harbors, conversely, should the 
defendant be able to call on safe harbors when common law defenses 
have failed? The answer is probably no, considering the court’s 
penchant for plain language interpretation, but the argument is a 
plausible one. The court was likely satisfied with the seemingly 
straightforward reasoning it asserted to support its holding and thus 
did not address this argument which was not asserted. 
While plain language meaning is the primary tool for statutory 
interpretation, a court would be remiss not to also look at legislative 
history.178 The DMCA’s legislative history actually does provide 
support for the proposition that pre-1972 recordings should be subject 
to the Copyright Act. Moreover, the Act’s history strengthens the 
assertion that § 512’s safe-harbor provisions encompass both common 
law and federal law. Senator Orrin Hatch reported that: 
Section 512 is not intended to imply that a service provider is or is 
not liable as an infringer either for conduct that qualifies for a 
limitation of liability or for conduct that fails to so qualify. Rather, 
the limitations of liability apply if the provider is found to be liable 
under existing principles of law.179 
Existing principles of law at the time Senator Hatch spoke were the 
pre-DMCA Copyright Act, state copyright statutes, and common law. 
 
177 Id. § 512(l) (emphasis added). 
178 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“[T]he 
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic 
material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they 
shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous 
terms.”). 
179 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998) (emphasis added). 
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Hence, one could reasonably postulate that Congress intended § 512 
and the safe harbors therein to apply to federal and state copyright 
laws. Use of legislative history could have galvanized the MP3tunes 
court’s position, but instead it stubbornly relied on a questionable 
plain language interpretation. 
There is plenty to like in the MP3tunes court’s holding as sound 
policy, but its misguided focus on statutory interpretation is open to 
attack. Seventeen U.S.C. § 301(c) is explicit that the Copyright Act 
does not preempt the common law with regard to pre-1972 
recordings. The court was perhaps a little quick to navigate around 
that provision. By circumventing § 301(c), the court opens itself to 
accusations of judicial activism. The DMCA went a long way in 
addressing the expansion of online technology, but its sweep was 
probably not broad enough to thoroughly align the Copyright Act 
with the demands of an Internet world. To try and overturn MP3tunes, 
record companies will have a strong separation-of-powers argument. 
They can assert that the court acted contrary to the express intent of 
Congress, and the power to make statutory amendments is strictly 
reserved to the legislative branch.180 
The MP3tunes court arguably reached a good, forward-thinking 
conclusion, but the reasoning it applied may not stand up to further 
judicial scrutiny. Congressional action is required to consolidate pre-
1972 recordings’ place in the Copyright Act, and the following 
sections proffer arguments why that should happen and reasons to 
believe it will. 
B. The U.S. Copyright Office Discusses Incorporation of Pre-1972 
Recordings 
The likelihood of legislative reform was strengthened when the 
United States Copyright Office (USCO) recently concluded that pre-
1972 recordings should be within the purview of the Copyright Act. 
The report, mandated by Congress’s Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
2009, “recommends federal copyright protection should apply to 
sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972.”181 The USCO 
notes that the reason for excluding pre-1972 recording was never 
 
180 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
181 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND 
RECORDINGS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, at ix (2011), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf. 
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actually made clear.182 The USCO report questions the viability of a 
system whereby a musical composition, subject to the Copyright Act, 
enters the public domain seventy-five years after publication, but 
under § 301(c), a recording of the same work remains out of the 
public domain until 2067.183 Addressing the objections of record 
companies, the USCO proposes that if Congress federalizes pre-1972 
recordings, then the copyright in those recordings should vest in 
whoever owned the copyright under state law immediately before 
federalization.184 
Policy justifications found by the USCO include improving “the 
certainty and consistency of copyright law” and encouraging 
“preservation and access activities.”185 In terms of preservation and 
access, the USCO acknowledges that digitalization is the inevitable 
modern means to preserve sound recordings. It recognizes owners’ 
concerns about infringement, particularly due to private collectors’ 
copying and transferring of their work.186 However, the USCO 
reasons that provisions in the Copyright Act reflect the public interest 
in libraries and certain archives having the ability to “preserve 
cultural and historical works for posterity.”187 The public has a strong 
interest in access to rare and old recordings, which may have never 
been widely available or only available in an obsolete format. One of 
the USCO’s major concerns is that while libraries are making 
preservation efforts, the access to recordings over the Internet cannot 
become widespread because libraries fear they may be subject to the 
laws of any of the fifty states.188 In sum, findings of uncertainty and 
inconsistency in state copyright laws concerning preservation and 
 
182 Id. at viii. 
183 See id. at 5–6. A musical “composition” is the chord progression, melodies, and 
structure embodying the piece that is copyrighted as soon as fixed in a tangible medium; 
that usually means being written down as sheet music. The USCO provides the example of 
a musical composition both written and recorded in 1922. Id. Under the current rules, the 
composition falls within the usual purview of the Copyright Act, giving it seventy-five 
years of protection before it would have entered the public domain in 1997. Id. 
Conversely, the sound recording of the piece made in 1922 would, under § 301(c), remain 
out of the public domain and protected under state copyright laws until 2067. Id. 
184 Id. at ix. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. at 59. 
187 Id. at 65. The USCO specifically cites § 108 of the Copyright Act, which allows for 
preservation of unpublished works and damaged or deteriorating ones, concluding that the 
section should be updated to better reflect the needs of digital preservation. Id. at 65–66; 
see 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006). 
188 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 181, at 79. 
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access are forwarded as the USCO’s public-interest justification for 
federalizing the rights associated with pre-1972 recordings. 
The USCO report discusses § 512 safe harbors and it includes a 
portion casting doubt on the MP3tunes court’s reasoning. The USCO 
finds no reason for pre-1972 recordings to be outside of safe harbor 
protections, although it acknowledges that some courts’ interpretation 
of § 512 may have been unfavorable to copyright holders.189 It also 
notes that, at the time the DMCA was enacted, Congress may not 
have envisaged the extent to which user-uploaded content would 
saturate the Internet, the resulting abundant infringement, and extreme 
amount of takedown notices issued.190 The report suggests: 
“Congress might want to take another look at section 512 to 
determine whether it requires updating or other refinements to reflect 
current conditions.”191 Regarding MP3tunes, the USCO finds the 
court’s reasoning “highly questionable,” particularly its conclusion 
that Congress intended § 512(c) to regulate pre-1972 recordings.192 
That conclusion, it reasoned, broke a fundamental rule of statutory 
interpretation that “one section of a statute cannot be interpreted in a 
manner that implicitly repeals another section.”193 Offering a small 
olive branch, the USCO did agree with the MP3tunes court that 
“section 301(c) does not prohibit all subsequent regulation of pre-
1972 recordings.”194 After all, the USCO and the MP3tunes court are 
pulling for the same result: federalization of pre-1972 recordings. 
C. Argument for Legislative Action 
The exclusion of pre-1972 recordings from rights, remedies, and 
defenses under the Copyright Act is outdated. The Act should be 
amended accordingly to include them and unify federal copyright law 
concerning sound recordings. The effect and growth of the Internet 
cannot be reversed. More and more copyrighted music, film, and 
other multimedia will continue to be added into the flow of 
information. The Internet will continue to expand exponentially. The 
governance of copyrights through one system of law will clarify 
 
189 See id. at 130. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 130–32. 
193 Id. at 132. 
194 Id. at 131 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC (MP3tunes), 821 F. 
Supp. 2d 627, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
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rights to parties on both sides of disputes, and to courts presiding over 
disputes. Congress showed wise foresight in its implementation of 
DMCA safe-harbor protections, but that was fourteen years ago. 
Congress should revisit and revise the Copyright Act once again and 
at a minimum bring pre-1972 recordings in line with other sound 
recordings. That will help to continue the Act’s evolution alongside 
developing technology. Modern copyright law governs not only a 
national, but a global enterprise and it is appropriate to federalize 
remaining loose ends, namely, pre-1972 recordings. 
In this age of electronic information exchange, the interests of both 
the legal community and copyright owners can only be effectively 
served by a cohesive system of federal copyright law. The MP3tunes 
decision may have stretched reasonable interpretation of the 
Copyright Act and has its detractors in the USCO, but the collective 
goal aligns. There is no predicting whether the MP3tunes holding will 
survive due to questionable reasoning, so the best ultimate outcome 
would be congressional amendment of the Copyright Act in 
accordance with the findings of the USCO. However, the lobbying 
power of the record industry is strong, and it is unrealistic to expect it 
to simply concede on the issue of pre-1972 recordings. 
Congress has constitutional justification to act under the Copyright 
and Patent Clause.195 While the record industry would surely 
challenge such action, the United States Supreme Court consistently 
defers to the legislature when Congress’s enumerated patent and 
copyright powers are implicated.196 Moreover, § 301(c) of the 
Copyright Act, providing that federal law is preempted by the 
common law, is from a bygone era that did not contemplate the 
Internet’s cultural domination, and does not effectively serve the 
needs of an Internet-oriented society that maintains functionality 
through interstate commerce. The section also disregards important 
policy concerns. The USCO’s public policy justifications of 
preservation and access are legitimate. Libraries should be 
encouraged to archive rare recordings and make them available 
without fear of unpredictable repercussions. Regulation is still 
required to preserve owners’ rights, but access to cultural and 
 
195 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
196 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878, 887 (2012) (refusing to second-
guess Congress’s authority to make political decisions under the Copyright and Patent 
Clause); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (holding that provided an enactment 
is rational, the Court may not second-guess congressional measures concerning copyright 
protection “however debatable or arguably unwise they may be”). 
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historical artifacts is a valuable public interest. However, this all leads 
back to the argument for one uniform system of federal law 
overseeing copyright, particularly in the context of the Internet. 
Admittedly, record companies have legitimate concerns about the 
difficulty in policing copied material on the Internet, but cases such as 
MP3tunes have shown that DMCA safe harbors do not provide an 
impenetrable shield for OSPs. Even if MP3tunes’s position does not 
hold, the use of pre-1972 recordings as a justification for suing will 
inevitably end. Congress, having tasked the USCO with investigating 
this issue, will likely amend the Copyright Act in accord with the 
Office’s findings. Meanwhile, OSPs might become more zealous in 
their compliance with safe-harbor requirements. Record companies 
need to get to the negotiating table with OSPs to create solid 
structures for royalty payments satisfactory to both sides. That should 
have been done at a much earlier stage. However, it is still not too late 
to embrace the Internet and stay out of the courtroom. Perhaps the 
best result for everyone concerned would be contractual solutions to 
create a satisfactory payment system and create a more harmonious 
relationship between record companies and OSPs. 
There have already been radical ideas for music distribution 
stemming from artists themselves. In an ideal world, any agreements 
reached would also be satisfactory to artists. However, evidence 
suggests that certain artists believe free music can help rather than 
hinder their ultimate profitability. Prince, for example, gave away an 
album free with a British newspaper.197 His reasoning was that he 
would accumulate fans’ goodwill and earn much higher percentage 
royalties from touring and merchandise.198 Radiohead, with a similar 
rationale, devised a model whereby fans named their price for 
downloading its album.199 Those examples suggest there could be 
ways to embrace digitalization of music and bargain-hungry 
consumers, while still earning a substantial profit. With a degree of 
cooperation and licensing between OSPs and record companies, 
instant and free Internet access to music is arguably a highly effective, 
big-picture marketing tool. Conversely, negative consequences could 
 
197 See Jumana Farouky, Why Prince’s Free CD Ploy Worked, TIME (July 18, 2007), 
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1644427,00.html. 
198 See id. 
199 See Andre Paine & Jonathan Cohen, Radiohead Lets Fans Name Price For New 
Album, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display 
/industry/news/e3idfeca89126ab60e01b7b942b521eca05. 
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arise if free music became the norm. Bands frequently experience 
volatile relationships. Once a group splits, touring is no longer a 
possibility, and the members’ livelihoods depend on exploiting their 
back catalog. Ultimately, if the entertainment industry devotes more 
energy to exploiting new technologies than to litigation, everyone will 
benefit in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Exclusion of pre-1972 recordings from safe-harbor coverage is 
counterintuitive and creates confusion as to which law should be 
applied. The only way to eliminate the pervasive uncertainty 
surrounding the Internet is to bring all copyright law surrounding 
sound recordings under the federal Copyright Act. Congress will face 
intense lobbying from concerned copyright holders in the music 
industry, but the Internet is an instrument of interstate commerce. As 
such, the copying, using, and transferring of any digitalized music 
recording should be governed uniformly by the federal act, and not 
the laws of fifty separate states. The DMCA began to address the 
issues associated with the Internet, and safe harbors are a fair means 
of protection. But technology has probably never progressed at such a 
rapid rate at any point in history nor outgrown a law so quickly. 
Therefore, the Copyright Act must develop alongside technology to 
maintain clarity. 
No matter what the solution ends up being, three things remain 
certain. First, those with programming skills and entrepreneurial spirit 
will continue seeking ways to sidestep copyright law and they will 
continue prioritizing potentially substantial short-term rewards over 
fear of legal consequences. Second, record companies will remain 
litigious, strive to maximize returns, and fight wholesale change. 
Third, consumers will keep loving free music. 
 
